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Abstract
We make a first step towards a positive theory of privatization, in a framework
similar to the one of Shleifer and Vishny’s “Politicians and Firms” (QJE, 1994). In
our model, a government may want to privatize because privatization can provide
managers with stronger incentives to exert effort, and more managerial effort may
help to maintain jobs that otherwise would be destroyed. However, the government
trades off better managerial incentives with the costs of losing control, here, over
funds that the government provides for the restructuring of firms. We also show that
if managers care for the size of their firm, privatization may weaken, not strengthen
incentives.
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1. Introduction
Privatization has been on the agendas of many western countries since the late seventies.
It has also been a main building block of the transition strategies of former centrally
planned economies. The scale of world-wide privatization is considerable. According to
the OECD (2002), the average annual value of privatized assets in the world amounted to
54 billion USD in the period covering 1990 to 2001, and the total privatization proceeds
in accession countries between 1999-2001 are around 60 billion USD.
Two economic approaches compete in explaining why state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
are inefficient. Following Sappington and Stiglitz (1987), who showed that privatiza-
tion does not matter when complete contracts can be written, both approaches assume
contractual incompleteness. Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Schmidt (1996) argue that
weak commitment power of benevolent governments, the monopoly status of SOEs, and
informational asymmetries, are the causes for bad managerial incentives under state
ownership.
The second approach, brought forward by Shleifer and Vishny (1994), argues that
self-interested politicians intervene in the conduct of SOEs in order to pursue goals
that are not aligned with enterprise efficiency. In particular, politicians are interested
in maintaining excess levels of employment to please their constituency. Privatization
‘depoliticizes’ enterprises: When managers receive cash-flow and control rights over
assets, it becomes more costly for politicians to influence the conduct of firms, their
incentives to intervene decrease, and the management of firms can make more efficient
decisions. This approach has been refined by Bennedsen (2000) who analyzes the impact
of privatization in a political structure allowing different coalitions between organised
interest groups competing for excess employment and subsidies.
The models of Shleifer-Vishny and Bennedsen, while providing predictions about
the effect of privatization, do not help to understand the motives of a government
to privatize. Given that the government loses its ability to influence firms conduct
as a consequence of privatization, why should privatizations ever happen — except for
exogenous reasons?
In this paper we make a first step towards a positive theory of privatization in a
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framework similar to the one of Shleifer and Vishny. We argue that the government
may, after all, be interested in making firms more efficient. Privatization may provide
managers with stronger incentives to exert effort; more managerial effort may help to
create jobs, or to maintain jobs that otherwise would be destroyed, without requiring
the inefficient kind of government intervention Shleifer and Vishny investigate. Put
differently, privatizing, via increased managerial efficiency, may be a cheaper way to
maintain or to create employment than the subsidization of loss-making SOEs. As
Shleifer and Vishny assume that managers are intrinsically motivated to take efficient
decisions, this effect is absent in their model.
This point and the tradeoffs a government faces when privatizing a firm are brought
forward in a simple framework (laid out in Section 2) that combines elements of Shleifer
and Vishny’s model with the Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) model on soft budget
constraints. In the model, the government’s aim is to preserve employment in a firm hit
by a macroshock like transition. Restructuring requires injection of funds, and a costly
effort by the manager. Following Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Laffont and Tirole
(1993) and Schmidt (1996), we assume that the manager’s cost of undertaking effort is
private information. Capital markets are imperfect and managers have no cash. Hence,
only the government can provide the funds for restructuring, privatization can only be
carried out through give-away schemes, and the government cannot screen managers
according to their productivities.
In Section 3, we consider that the government has the choice to either transfer cash
flow and control rights in a bundle, or to keep the status quo. Privatization then involves
the following trade-off for the government. On the one hand, productive managers’
incentives to restructure increase when they receive cash flow rights. This is in the
interest of the government as restructured firms can employ more labor in a profitable
way than unrestructured ones. On the other hand, the government loses control over the
restructuring funds, which gives rise to a soft budget constraint problem. Unproductive
managers abuse their control rights and divert the capital. Subsequently, they blackmail
the government, which in order to avoid bankruptcy and layoff of workers, refinances
the firm. This effect arises naturally in a dynamic model of privatization like ours, while
it is, by design, excluded in the static one Shleifer and Vishny propose.
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Privatization thus combines first best (some managers restructure) and third best
(other managers shirk and steal the money of the government). State ownership corre-
sponds to the second best : while there is less or no restructuring effort by the manager,
the government avoids the softer budget constraint of unrestructured firms that arise
as a result of the transfer of control to the manager. When the enterprise is sufficiently
profitable, the positive incentive effects outweigh the negative effects on the budget and
the firm is privatized.
In 3.2, we address a second point. By and large, the western privatization experience
is in line with the prediction of Shleifer and Vishny. Some of the earlier studies found
little effect of privatization, but the most recent and comprehensive ones by Megginson,
Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) and Megginson and Netter (1998) find that priva-
tized firms become more profitable, increase their capital investment spending and their
labor productivity, and receive less subsidies. However, in transition economies, the
efficiency gains associated to privatization appear less prominent. Carlin, van Reenen
and Wolf (1995) find no effect of private ownership on the restructuring activities of
managers. Konings (1997) sample of 334 firms in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in-
dicates no significant differences in the growth rate of privatized enterprises vs SOE’s.
Frydman et al (1999) analyze a sample of 218 mid-size manufacturing firms in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland, and corroborate the view that only outsider ownership
involves efficiency gains. For Russia, Earle and Estrin (1997) find no significant perfor-
mance difference between SOEs and privatized enterprises. Djankov (1999) identifies no
significant difference in restructuring activities between SOEs and privatized enterprises
in a sample of six CIS countries, and for Mongolia, Anderson et al. (2000) even find
that SOEs are performing better than privatized enterprises.
Our model shows that the incentive effects of give-away privatization depend to a
large extent on the objectives that managers pursue, which may explain the difference
between the transition and the OECD experience. In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny
(1994), we do not constrain our analysis to intrinsically profit-oriented managers, but
consider that managers may have an interest in preserving excess employment. They
may be empire-builders [Jensen (1986)]; they may dislike changes in their organization
[Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997)]; or they may face powerful worker collectives
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[Aghion and Blanchard (1995)]. In transition economies, managers may strive for po-
litical influence that increases with the number of workers a manager employs. Ericson
(1999) reports survey evidence that “prestige, power and social obligation motivate man-
agement, rather than the pursuit of the creation of economic value.”
In our model, when managers have an interest in preserving employment, while
the government is subject to a budget constraint (as it is the case for many transition
economies), privatization may weaken rather than strengthen the incentives of man-
agers. The intuition is that state ownership may give managers ‘negative’ incentives
to restructure: unless they work hard, the government fires workers because it cannot
afford to cover the losses due to excess employment.1 This induces the more productive
among them to exert effort. But, upon receiving control over restructuring funds, these
negative incentives lose their bite. Managers can divert the restructuring funds in order
to cover the losses due to too much employment, rather than going through a painful
restructuring process which takes much effort. The non-restructuring option becom-
ing more attractive, privatization can hence only improve the incentives of managers
if the positive incentives associated with residual claimancy are sufficiently strong, i.e.,
in rather profitable firms. In unprofitable ones, however, incentives would deteriorate
when the firm were privatized. In 3.3, we briefly discuss what can be learnt if one allows
for separate transfer of cash flow and control rights.
Section 4 discusses some empirical support for the assumptions of our model and
implications of the analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
The firm is initially state-owned and employs excess labor L. The government, G (“it”),
receives a political benefit BG if no workers are fired, and loses it otherwise. Thus, BG
can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between political benefits and one
unit of capital. BG depends, for instance, on external pressure to stabilize the budget,
on the preferences of the median voter and on the situation the government inherits
1Cf. Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1996) who report that Polish state managers begun restructuring
when budget constraints became harder due to the monetary stabilization programme.
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from its predecessors. We assume that G has two units of capital, and that BG ∈ [1, 2).
Thus, it is worthwhile for G to provide one unit of capital in order to maintain high
employment, but it would ex ante not be willing to pay two units of capital. We assume
that the government is the only source of finance. This reflects underdeveloped financial
markets, and in the case of transition economies, the fact that assets were usually given
to insider managers, who were able to secure funds from state-owned banks.
The manager, M, prefers, ceteris paribus, a larger to a smaller firm, that is, higher
to lower employment,2 and receives a private benefit BM ∈ [0, 2) when no labor is shed,
while he loses these benefits in case jobs are destroyed. In a way similar to BG, BM
represents the marginal rate of substitution between managerial rents and one unit of
capital that may originate from profits of the firm or subsidies.
Successful restructuring of the enterprise requires first, new capital, i.e., financial
restructuring, and second, managerial effort. When M exerts restructuring effort, he
incurs disutility e. The disutility is known only to him, but not to the government, who
only knows that e is uniformly distributed on the support [0, e]. If M shirks, he incurs
no disutility.
After the injection of funds, three situations (‘states’) are possible:
1. ‘UR’ : Without financial restructuring, the firm remains unrestructured and both
M and G end up with a zero payoff. Managerial effort alone has no effect on
the enterprise, and will consequently never be undertaken unless the firm is also
financially restructured.
2. ‘PR’ : If financial restructuring takes place, but is not supported by managerial
effort, the enterprise is partially restructured and it depends on the size of employ-
ment whether or not the firm can be run in a profitable way. Employing excess
employment L, the firm makes losses R(L) ∈ [−1, 0]; when excess employment is
fired, the firm generates a profit R(0) ∈ [1, 2].
3. ‘CR’ : If both financial restructuring and managerial effort take place, the firm is
2This notion of a relationship between managerial private benefit and the ‘size’ of the firm is also
used by Schmidt (1996).
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completely restructured, and generates a profit of Re(L) ≥ R(0) + 1.
Two comments. First, the above assumptions are based on the idea that new cap-
ital increases the productivity of workers. Nonetheless, without managerial effort, the
marginal productivity of the L excess workers and remains negative, outweighing the
profits that are generated by workers whose marginal productivity is positive. When
both new capital and managerial effort are provided, all workers can be employed in
a profitable way, and no labor needs to be shed.3 Second, as will become clear below,
the assumptions that completely restructured firms need not reduce their employment,
together with Re(L) ≥ R(0) + 1, ensure that the government will have no incentive to
intervene in the conduct of such a firm, and that productive managers have no incentive
to behave opportunistically.
2.1. Ownership
At this stage, we restrict our attention to two possible ownership forms. When the firm
is state-owned, G controls the use of the funds injected in the firm, and decides whether
or not to fire workers. Through privatization, G gives both cash flow and control rights
over restructuring funds and employment in the firm to the manager who has no cash.
We blackbox the topic of worker-management relations. At this stage, we only analyze
the joint transfer of control and cash flow rights. In section 3.3, we briefly discuss
separate transfers of control and cash flow rights.
Property rights come to the forefront when complete contracts are not feasible. In the
spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986), we assume the following concerning contractibility:
Assumption 1: The use of funds, employment, and profits are not verifiable.
Assumption 2: As in a standard debt contract, the funds injected can be recovered by
the government, provided the firm has positive profits.
Assumption 3 : The state of the enterprise (UR, PR, CR) is assumed to be observable,
but non-verifiable by a third party. Consequently, the government cannot write
3Notice that the distinction between fully and partially restructured firms corresponds to Grosfeld
and Roland (1995) concept of ‘strategic’ versus ‘defensive’ restructuring.
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incentive contracts with the manager that link an effort level with some specified
payment.
Given these assumptions, the allocation of control rights (between G and M) over
the use of funds and the choice of employment becomes crucial for the course the re-
structuring process takes, and the only way to provide managers with restructuring
incentives is to transfer the cash flow rights to them.
2.2. Timing and payoffs
Figure 1 presents the extensive form of the game. Initially, the enterprise is state-
owned. G injects a unit of capital, and decides whether or not to privatize the firm.
G’s ownership decision cannot be influenced by M; the structure of the game, however,
ensures that under privatization the manager can never lose compared to the status
quo. Upon privatization, M and G sign a contract that commits M to pay back the
funds that are injected in the firm. Subsequently, Nature determines the type of the
manager. In what follows we describe the subgames under state and private ownership,
respectively.
State ownership
1. M decides whether to exert effort or to shirk, and G assures that the capital
initially injected is used for restructuring purposes.
2. After having observed the state of the firm (either completely or partially restruc-
tured), G decides on whether or not to reduce employment in the firm. In case M
has exerted effort, it is always optimal to maintain all workers.
3. Payoffs are realized.
For each leaf of the game tree, the first term denotes G’s, the latter M’s payoff,
which, for simplicity are also summarized in Table 1.
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Table1: SOE G’s payoff M’s payoff
CR Re +BG − 1 BM − e
PR, no workers fired R(L) +BG − 1 BM
PR, L workers fired R(0)− 1 0
Private ownership
1. The manager decides on the use of the capital that G has injected. Either he uses
it for the restructuring of the firm and exerts effort, or he keeps the money ‘in his
pocket’ and shirks. If M has exerted effort, the firm is completely restructured,
otherwise it remains unrestructured.
2. If M has shirked, he asks G for refinancing. Then, G decides whether to bailout the
firm by providing an additional unit of capital; otherwise, the firm is liquidated.
If G injects the capital, it controls the proper use of it. Subsequently, M decides
on whether or not to layoff workers in the firm which at this time is partially
restructured.
3. Payoffs are realized.
The payoffs are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: privatized G’s payoff M’s payoff
CR BG Re(L) +BM − 1− e
Liquidated −1 1
PR, no workers fired BG − 2 R(L) +BM + 1
PR, L workers fired R(0)− 2 1
A couple of remarks may be useful to explain the thoughts behind the game and
payoffs under private ownership. First, notice that when M retains all workers after the
bailout, he finances the losses of the firm through the funds he received in the beginning
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of the game. When M lays off workers, G is entitled to cash in the profits the firm
yields, since M owes two units of capital to G.4
Second, it may seem that there is a contradiction between the assumption that no
contracts can be written contingent on the state of the firm, and the assumption that the
government can recoup profits (partially or totally). What we have in mind is similar
to a standard debt contract: if the manager does not pay the credit back, the creditor
(government) can step in to get its money back. This does not collide with the fact that
incentive contracts are unfeasible. Notice also that the assumption is not important for
our main results: We could assume that the government cannot get back any of the
funds it lent to the firm. However, this would bias the results against privatization,
which we want to avoid.
Third, in stage 2 of the game, we assume that if the manager has shirked, the
government steps in, and at this stage controls the use of funds. In a way similar
to the assumption about the government’s ability to recoup part of the funds it has
injected, this assumption is taken to stack the deck in favor of privatization, and it is
not needed for any of the results. We believe our setting to make sense for the following
reasons. In case privatization has not had positive effects, the manager is clearly bad,
and any money injected into the manager-controlled firm would be wasted. However,
refinancing under government control is pareto-improving. Thus, there is no reason why
the manager should not be willing to allow the government to control the use of funds
at the ex post stage. One could model this bargaining game explicitly, without gaining
additional insights.
3. Analysis of the Model
We solve the model by backward induction. In state ownership, and if M has not exerted
effort, G’s employment choice is:
4Notice that an option that does not occur in equilibrium is that M would ask for refinancing and exert
effort subsequently. Here, M has nothing to gain compared to immediate restructuring, since he must
pay back both units of capital. In particular, if waiting implies a small cost, immediate restructuring
becomes a strictly dominant strategy for productive managers.
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L, if BG ≥ R(0)−R(L), ((1))
0, if BG < R(0)−R(L). ((2))
In other words, G preserves (cuts) excess employment in a partially restructured firm
if its political benefit associated with high employment is large (small) relative to addi-
tional profits that are generated by the respective employment cuts. In the remainder
of the paper we will label a government that preserves employment in a partially re-
structured firm ‘employment-maximizing”. A government that cuts down employment
will be labeled ‘budget-stabilizing’.5 Unlike Bennedsen (2000), we do not try to explain
the origin of these rents, but are rather concerned about how different magnitudes of
rents may affect a government’s decision to privatize.
Inspecting the payoffs in Table 2 it is clear that in private ownership the government
always bails out the firm, since both players cannot lose compared to liquidation. Thus
G’s loss of control over the restructuring funds when the firm is privatized gives rise to a
soft budget constraint as in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). Upon receiving additional
funds, M employs
L, if BM ≥ −R(L), ((3))
0, if BM < −R(L). ((4))
We will label a manager who has preferences according to condition (3), ‘rent-seeking’ ;
if M’s preferences correspond to cond. (4) we will use the term ‘profit-oriented’.
Figure 2 depicts cond. (1) to (4) in the space of G’s (x-axis) and M’s (y-axis) prefer-
ences. There are four cases the emergence of which is due to our assumption of discrete
employment choice. These cases should be considered as a discrete approximation for
the continuum of possible constellations that emerge when the choice of employment is
continous.
5Notice that the government may fire workers, even if keeping excess employment increases the joint
pay-off of G and M. This is the case if BG < R(0)−R(L), but BG+BM ≥ R(0)−R(L) ≡ ∆R. However,
since M has no cash, he cannot bribe G to retain excess employment.
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Case A: Privatization involves less excess employment if (1) and (4) hold.
Case B: Excess employment is preserved irrespective of ownership if (1) and (3) hold.
Case C: Excess employment is laid off irrespective of ownership if (2) and (4) hold.
Case D: Privatization involves more excess employment if (2) and (3) hold.
If, as in cases B and C, G’s and M’s interests are sufficiently aligned, employment
decisions are not affected by ownership. The relative size of M’s to G’s rents becomes
crucial in cases A and D.
We focus on the two cases that provide the most interesting insights: first, the situ-
ation in which an employment-maximizing government faces a profit-oriented manager
(case A); second, the case of a budget-stabilizing government facing a rent-seeking man-
ager (case D). Case A is similar to the one proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1994).
Here, the manager’s objective is maximization of profits, while the government is seek-
ing to preserve excess employment. As in Shleifer and Vishny, privatization leads to
labor-shedding. The opposite is true in case D where the government’s private benefit
associated with preserving high employment is smaller than the manager’s. We believe
that this is a relevant case for some transition economies, in particular, the former So-
viet Union where managers of larger firms seek political influence that depends on the
size of the firm.
3.1. Employment-maximizing government, profit-oriented manager
We first derive the cutoff disutility levels beyond which managers shirk. A comparison
of these levels in state versus private ownership allows to examine the incentive effects
associated with privatization. We then analyze the budgetary effects of privatization,
and, finally, derive conditions under which the government decides to privatize. It turns
out that this case reflects the evidence about privatization in the West: the transfer
of cash flow and control rights improves managerial incentives, and involves less excess
employment and subsidies.
Incentives: In state ownership, exerting effort has no benefits, but only costs for M,
since the government preserves high employment irrespectively of the state the enterprise
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is in. Consequently, there are no incentives to exert effort. Comparing the two payoffs,
we can solve for the critical disutility level beyond which the manager shirks in private
ownership:
eap = Re − 2 +BM . ((5))
Employment: Denote αap =
eap
e the probability that the ‘private’ manager exerts
effort. Since (1 − αap) managers shirk and subsequently cut down employment, the
expected excess employment in private ownership is
Lap = αapL, ((6))
which is smaller than the expected excess employment in state ownership where excess
employment is always maintained.
Budget: Subsidies have negative sign, and profit transfers from M to G a positive
one. Irrespective of ownership, there is the initial subsidy G pays to all firms. Com-
pletely restructured private firms pay back their loan. Private managers who have
not restructured receive additional subsidies, but the profits of these firms are col-
lected by the government. The net transfer from G to M in private ownership is hence
(1−αap) [R(0)− 2] < 0. In state ownership, the government controls the use of funds and
hence there is no need for refinancing. However, G must finance the losses due to excess
employment which amounts to R(L) − 1. Hence, in both private and state ownership,
there are subsidies from G to M. Subsidies in state ownership are larger than the ones
in private ownership, because |R(0)− 2| < |R(L)− 1|.
Privatization decision: By comparison of the government’s payoff under state and
private ownership, we derive the government’s value associated with privatization:
V a = αapBG + (1− αap) [R(0)− 2]− [BG +R(L)− 1] . ((7))
If V a ≥ 0, the government privatizes, otherwise the firm is kept in state ownership.
By substituting for αap, and rearranging we derive Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose the government is employment-maximizing, and the manager
profit-maximizing. Then, the government privatizes firms, which when completely re-
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structured, yield
R ≥ Rae = 2−BM + e
[BG + 1−∆R]
[BG + 2−R(0)]
. ((8))
Eq. (7) and Proposition 1 shed some light on the important question: Why would
a government whose main interest is to preserve employment want to privatize? We
show the costs and benefits of privatization from the government’s perspective. On one
hand, privatization involves the loss of jobs in those firms were managers do not exert
effort. On the other hand, private ownership incites productive managers to exert effort,
while in state ownership they would shirk. Inducing the manager to exert effort is the
cheapest way to preserve jobs since restructured firms can employ more workers in an
efficient way. Hence, the net job destruction due to privatization decreases, the larger
the incentive effects of privatization. This is tantamount to larger Re and/or smaller e,
that is, the higher managerial skills are on average. By the same token, better incentives
involve less subsidies since more managers pay back their loan in private ownership. At
the cut-off value Rae , the costs of preserving the employment differential between state
and private ownership outweighs its benefit, and the government prefers to privatize.
3.2. Budget-stabilizing Government, rent-seeking manager
A government that is disciplined by the need to stabilize its budget cuts down employ-
ment unless the manager has restructured. In private ownership, the manager maintains
high employment as outlined at the beginning of this section. By comparing the crit-
ical disutility levels in state and private ownership, the following Proposition can be
established.
Proposition 2. Suppose the government is budget-stabilizing and the manager rent-
seeking. Then, incentives are stronger in state than in private ownership if and only
if
BM > Re −R(L)− 2. ((9))
Proposition 2 states that managerial incentives deteriorate as a consequence of pri-
vatization when managerial rents are sufficiently large, and the effect of restructuring
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on the profitability of firms is not too strong. The intuition of this result goes as follows.
In state ownership, managers have some incentive to exert restructuring effort, because
the government has a credible threat to cut employment unless the manager has restruc-
tured, and preserving high employment has substantial value for them. Privatization
has two effects in this situation. First, the transfer of cash flow rights improves M’s
incentives, but only slightly as Re is small. Second, receiving control over the restruc-
turing funds the manager can divert the funds in order to finance the losses associated
with excess employment. In turn, the commitment of the government not to refinance
the firm is undermined, because it becomes less expensive for the government to keep
the enterprise afloat when the manager pays for the losses of the firm. G is then willing
to inject another unit of capital in order to preserve high employment. Expecting to be
bailed out, the non-restructuring option becomes more attractive to the manager than
going through the restructuring process. Hence, if condition (9) holds, a manager, who
in state ownership, would exert effort, shirks in private ownership.
It should be noted that privatization would here not be in the interest of the gov-
ernment. That is, one would have to depart from a positive perspective to rationalize
weaker incentives as a consequence of privatization. However, in transition economies,
governments have oftentimes been under external pressure to privatize which may ratio-
nalize why privatization involved, on average, limited efficiency gains in many transition
economies.
Proposition 2 has an interesting implication for the theory of ownership that builds
on Grossman and Hart (1986). Here, two parties invest in assets that if used within
their relationship have higher value than outside of the relationship. If the assets are
not integrated, i.e., if each party controls only one asset, the parties underinvest, since
they are subject to a problem of moral hazard in teams [Holmström (1982)]. Each party
only partially internalizes the consequences of their investments. In order to overcome
this free-riding problem and to maximize the joint surplus, ownership should be given
to the party to whom the relationship is more important.
In our setup, M and G’s investments are substitutes. If the manager exerts effort, the
joint surplus is maximized and no further investment by the government is required. The
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government being the owner of the firm internalizes losses and penalizes the manager by
laying off workers in case he has shirked. It is this threat that makes the manager exert
effort. In this situation, the transfer of cash flow rights from G to M has an ambigious
effect on overall efficiency. It increases the incentives of M, but distorts the ones of G.
As a consequence, the prediction that ownership should be concentrated in the hands
of the party that cares most about a joint project does not necessarily hold. Indeed,
it can be optimal to give ownership to the party for who the project is less important
(here: the government), in order to sustain the incentives of both parties to behave in
an efficient way.
For the remainder of the analysis, we assume that BM ≤ Re −R(L)− 2. It is then
straightforward to show that first, employment in private firms is larger than in state
firms; second, the budgetary impact of privatization is negative. The value function of
privatization is set up in a way similar to (7) with αdp =
Re−R(L)−2
e and αds =
BM
e . By
substitution, we obtain the condition under which G privatizes:
(1− αps)BG > 2(1− α
p
d) + α
s
d [Re −R(0)] +R(0)− 1. ((10))
where the left hand side represents G’s benefit associated with additional employment in
private firms, and the right hand side the respective budgetary losses. Substituting and
rearranging yields the next proposition. As in the preceding subsection, privatization
becomes desirable the more profitable the firm is if managers make a restructuring effort.
Proposition 3. Suppose the government is budget-stabilizing, the manager rent-seeking,
and BM ≤ Re−R(L)−2. Then, the government privatizes firms, which when completely
restructured, yield
R ≥ Rde =
[e−BM ] [R(L)−BM ] + e
[2−BM ]
. ((11))
3.3. Separate transfer of control and cash flow rights
In the preceding analysis, we have only looked at the joint transfer of cash flow and
control rights. We here summarize what can be learned from looking at mixed ownership
forms in which cash flow and control rights are held by different parties.6
6Debande and Friebel (1999) contains a more exhaustive treatment of this question.
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Following Shleifer and Vishny’s (1994) typology, we label ‘regulation’ an allocation
of ownership rights in which the government retains control rights, and the manager
receives cash flow rights. There is an evident budgetary advantage of regulation: G
does not lose control over the restructuring funds. More interestingly, regulation can
also improve the incentives of M to exert effort: While M’s payoff when exerting effort
is the same under both regulation and privatization, M’s payoff if he does not exert
effort is lower under regulation than under privatization. Not only can M not pocket
the injected funds, but G can set employment to levels that M does not like, which
induces M to work harder.7
Under ‘corporatization’, M receives control rights while the government retains cash
flow rights. It is straightforward to show that this ownership form combines the worst
elements of privatization and state ownership. First, it provides bad incentives to re-
structure, since the manager never internalizes the consequences of his actions. More-
over, M gains control over the restructuring funds and can divert them to unproductive
uses. This complements Bennedsen (2000) and Shleifer and Vishny’s (1994) view that
it is dangerous to transfer control rights to private agents without transfering cash flow
rights as well.
4. Discussion
We here discuss two assumptions of our model and some implications. First, our model
builds on the assumption that managerial effort can affect the technology of firms such
that more labor can be employed in a profitable way. This notion of restructuring,
similar to what Grosfeld and Roland (1995) call “strategic restructuring”, is in contrast
to what Shleifer and Vishny believe to be the main task of managers: to fire excess em-
7The result may be theoretically interesting, because it points to the fact that government control
used in bad states may increase managerial incentives to reach the good state. We would, however,
not want to stress the result too much, as it builds on a simplification: In our model, there is no
conflict between the manager and the government if the firm is restructured. If this where the case,
as in Shleifer and Vishny (1994), the retention of control rights by the government would reduce the
manager’s incentives to exert effort. There would then be a tradeoff for the government when deciding
whether or not to retain control rights.
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ployment. Empirical studies provide a mixed picture about the effects of privatization
on employment of firms. Megginson et al. (1994) find that privatization involved more
employment; Gupta et al. (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) find that employ-
ment levels decline, but with the interesting qualification that this effect is stronger for
richer economies. Bilsen and Konings (1998) report that transition leads to some initial
job destruction, but do not find major differences in the behaviour between SOEs and
privatized firms. In Boubakri and Cosset’s (1998) sample of developing (not transition)
economies, privatization increases employment. Finally, Frydman et al. (1999) pro-
vide clear evidence that privatization increases employment. The effect is particularly
striking for insider-privatized firms that lay off even less workers than SOEs. We thus
conclude that both hypothesis appear to be equally well supported by empirical work.
Second, the model also builds on the assumption that state ownership may be ben-
eficial because government control makes it harder for managers to divert funds. This
raises the question to which extent governments can execute their control rights in tran-
sition economies. Looking at three countries, Russia, Hungary and East Germany is
interesting in that respect.
At the outset of transition in Russia, government’s control over firms was already
rather weak, because control rights had been delegated from ministries to the manage-
ment of firms during Gorbachev’s reforms. These early reforms proved to be a major
obstacle for substantial reforms at later stages. As Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995)
argue, they had created a powerful group in society that had to be bribed in order
to agree to reforms. Whether or not the Russian government could have managed to
regain control over the corporatized firms, rather than giving them away to insiders, is
a question to be answered by historians.
In Hungary, similar decentralization developments had taken place prior to 1989.
However, supported by a public opinion opposed to spontaneous privatizations carried
out by insiders, control over the state-owned firms was firmly re-established. Subse-
quently, Hungary opted for a cash-sales-to-outsiders scheme, rather than transferring
property rights to insiders. The Hungarian State Property Agency targeted foreign in-
vestors, and was able to raise substantial revenues, in particular, through privatization
of profitable sectors like energy, telecommunication and tourism.
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(East) Germany’s Treuhandanstalt, however, decided to give away firms, mostly to
outsiders and to provide massive subsidies for restructuring purposes without exerting
a sufficient degree of control over the firms. A serious problem emerged, when the po-
litical costs of unemployment increased rapidly [Dyck and Wruck (1998)], and, in terms
of our model, the government changed its type from budget-stabilizing to employment-
maximizing. While rapid privatization might have been a good idea as long as the
government was committed not to refinance, the rapid give-away strategy turned out
to be very costly once this commitment was undermined. The Treuhandanstalt con-
tinued to inject funds into firms in order to secure employment. The total net costs of
privatization are estimated 300 billion DM, a large part of which were subsidies given
to outside investors. In contrast to Russia, Treuhandanstalt would have been able to
control its firms, maintain the unprofitable ones in state ownership in order to minimize
losses, while privatizing the profitable ones.
The brief discussion above shows that whether or not a government is able to re-
establish control over firms, depends mainly on political factors. It appears that in
Russia, the political balance of power might not have allowed the government to regain
control, while in Hungary, the government was supported by the public in its attempts
to bring spontanous privatization to a halt. In the case of Germany, rapid privatization
was a strategic choice brought forward in particular by the liberal party, and seems to
have been chosen rather on political than on economic grounds.
One surprising implication of our model is that privatization may soften, rather than
harden the budget constraints of firms. Djankov and Murrell (2002) provide evidence
that privatization tends to reduce the extent of the soft budget constraint problem.
However, the situation seems to differ between Central and Eastern Europe on one
hand, and Russia on the other. In Russia, the incidence of state support for failing
firms appears to have increased rather than decreased after privatization. One should
however be careful in assuming a causality, because many other things have changed
during the nineties in Russia, in particular, fiscal decentralization may have increased
the scope and taste for politicians’ interventions. Megginson and Netter (2001) confirm
the same picture: privatization has hardened the budget constraints in Central and
Eastern Europe, but not in Russia and other CIS countries. Finally, the example of
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Treuhand shows that privatization may be accompanied by massive subsidization.
Give-away privatization has been the most important mode of privatization in tran-
sition economies, and we believe our model to be particularly suited for insider privati-
zation, which has been the most important form of privatization in transition economies.
However, it also carries over to non-cash outsider privatization, as governments cannot
screen potential new owners according to their willingness to pay. Because being in
control of a firm allows owners to extract rents, unproductive agents have an incentive
to acquire firms. The absence of screening mechanisms does not allow to distinguish
them from the more productive ones. Privatization in East Germany provides a wealth
of cases [cf. Heimbrecht (1993)] that fit our idea of managers and investors diverting
the funds injected by Treuhandanstalt and utilizing the fact that Treuhandanstalt’s
commitment power decreased over time, due to increasing unemployment.
But even in mature market economies, the absence of screening through a price
mechanism causes problems: Wolfram (1998) shows that when insider managers stayed
in control of privatized electricity companies, they have extracted rents at the expense of
private shareholders. Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) find that the post-
privatization performance of companies that changed the composition of their board
of directors improved significantly compared to others in which the board remained
unchanged. Screening and managerial turnover thus appear to be essential components
of a successful privatization strategy.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed the motives of a self-interested government to privatize a
firm to insiders. Predictions about enterprise efficiency, employment and subsidies have
been developed, which are in line with the experience in many transition economies.
We have shown that governments trade off the loss of control over restructuring funds
against better managerial incentives. The theory also predicts that potentially profitable
firms should be more likely to be privatized. We have also pointed to the risk that when
privatization is imposed from the outside, privatization weakens managerial incentives
when managers care for high employment.
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